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CHAPTER 2: Wilayat Shahidat: Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and 
the Question of the Female Suicide Bomber 
By Elizabeth Pearson
Introduction
In the three years since then Boko Haram leader Abubakr Shekau pledged allegiance to Islamic State 
‘Caliph’ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, both movements have experienced a change in fortunes. In March 
2015, Boko Haram’s pledge led to the movement’s rebranding as Islamic State’s West Africa Province 
(ISWAP). The Islamic State at that time was attracting global recruits with its vision of a utopian Isla-
mist state. It boasted of well-functioning education, health, and police services, and a growing amount 
of territory acquired through violent jihad. Boko Haram was led, meanwhile, by an increasingly ambi-
tious Shekau, known worldwide for the group’s April 2014 abduction of more than 270 schoolgirls in 
Chibok, Borno State, Nigeria, and monitoring the changing landscape of global jihad. Just two months 
after al-Baghdadi declared the ‘Islamic State’ in June 2014, Shekau had announced his own ‘Dawla 
Islamiyya,’ or Islamic state, in northeastern Nigeria.185 Boko Haram leadership appeared to emulate 
Islamic State rhetoric and operations, from the holding of territory in northeastern Nigeria, which 
was new to Boko Haram, to integrating its media team with the Islamic State’s. 
Yet in June 2014, Boko Haram also introduced a tactic directly at odds with both al-Qa`ida Central 
and Islamic State doctrine and practice: female “suicide” terrorism (FST). By late 2015 the scale of 
Boko Haram female suicide attacks was already globally unprecedented.186 Boko Haram deployed 
its first female suicide bomber in an attack on a military barracks in Gombe State in June 2014, and 
since then it has far outstripped any previous terrorist group’s deployment of FST, whether religious 
or secular. As of February 28, 2018, a recorded 469 female “suicide bombers” have been deployed or 
arrested in 240 incidents, and they have killed more than 1,200 people across four countries: Nigeria, 
Niger, Chad and Cameroon.187 Almost 3,000 more people have been injured. Meanwhile, the Islamic 
State reportedly only first used FST in Syria and Iraq in 2017, as its caliphate project succumbed to 
sustained attack. Since then, there has been an October 2017 newsletter directive and a February 
2018 propaganda video endorsing female violence as part of the Islamic State jihad.188 However, FST 
is controversial—and mostly not approved of—in violent jihadi ideology. 
Through an analysis of the aims and organization of both Boko Haram and the Islamic State, this 
chapter explores this anomalous use of FST in West Africa. It argues that, as Gonzalez-Perez claims 
of female bombing in other groups, Boko Haram FST can also be understood as a tactic employed to 
185 At the time of Shekau’s pledge in March 2015, the new “West Africa Province” held almost 12,000 square miles of territory across 
Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states in northeastern Nigeria, an area the size of Belgium. David Blair, “Boko Haram Is Now a Mini-
Islamic State, with Its Own Territory,” Telegraph, January 10, 2015; Brandon Jones, “New video: Abubakar Shekau announces Boko 
Haram ‘Islamic State’ caliphate in Nigeria,” Global Dispatch, August 28, 2014.
186 Elizabeth Georgina Pearson, “Boko Haram and Nigeria’s Female Bombers,” RUSI, September 25, 2015. There are NGO reports of 
female bombers before 2014, however the author has been unable to triangulate them through media sources.
187 All figures on Boko Haram FST are drawn from a database maintained since June 2014 and initially collated with Jacob Zenn. 
Data is drawn from triangulated English- and French-language media reports, both national (Nigerian) and international, where 
possible. This database was also augmented with figures from UNICEF. “Failed” attacks, killing only the bomber, or where a bomber 
is “intercepted,” arrested (with or without later conviction), or shot, are included in the data. Open source media reports often cite 
officials from emergency services, but error in numbers is likely. The inclusion of French-language media data and contemporaneous 
data collection may explain the higher bomber figures than those in the CTC’s August 2017 report. Jason Warner and Hilary Matfess, 
Exploding Stereotypes: The Unexpected Operational And Demographic Characteristics of Boko Haram’s Suicide Bombers (West Point, 
NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2017).
188 Lizzie Dearden, “Isis Propaganda Video Shows Women Fighting for the First Time,” Independent, February 8, 2018; Rita Katz, “How do 
we know ISIS is losing? Now it’s asking women to fight,” Washington Post, November 2, 2017.
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“legitimize acts that are strategically and militarily utilitarian.”189 This chapter explicitly contrasts the 
gendered practices of the Islamic State and Boko Haram, showing the importance of a prohibition on 
Islamic State female violence until 2017 and the collapse of the Islamic State’s ‘state project.’ It seeks 
to understand Boko Haram’s prolific use of female suicide bombers, despite otherwise emulating the 
Islamic State. The central argument is that for both movements, female suicide bombing and female 
violence—or its absence—are primarily linked to the material needs and objectives of the group. When 
Boko Haram relied on female violence and the Islamic State did not, the discrepancy lay in the im-
portance of the state project and symbolic male violence to the Islamic State, versus the absence of a 
similarly coherent governance project for Boko Haram. While it had territory, the Islamic State oper-
ated a strongly codified gender ideology, wherein male violence was legitimized and female violence 
was not, and benefited from this in three key ways: recruitment, regulation, and unification. Without 
a similar state project, Boko Haram had greater freedom to improvise. The chapter also argues that 
Boko Haram’s tactical use of FST differs from that of any previous group because Boko Haram gives 
these women and girls no symbolic status. 
The argument proceeds in four sections. The first sets out the organizational advantages of FST and 
how these are evident in five evolving waves of Boko Haram female suicide bombing since June 2014. 
The second section explores the issue of coercive female bombing within Boko Haram and its impli-
cations for the ‘symbolic role’ of the bomber. The third section examines the prohibition on female 
violence in Islamic State ideology as central to the ‘state project,’ until its 2017 collapse. The fourth 
section discusses similarities in the approach to women by Boko Haram and the Islamic State, despite 
differences regarding FST. In particular, it emphasizes that both movements instrumentalize women 
and gender-based violence (GBV) for tactical gain. The focus on the relationship between these two 
movements means detailed comparison with other groups using FST is not undertaken in this chapter. 
Organizational and Tactical Perspectives in FST: The Case of Boko Haram 
What was new to Boko Haram in June 2014 was not new to global terrorism. In 1985, the secular 
Syrian Nationalist Army sent 16-year-old Sana’a Mehaidli to kill herself and two Israeli soldiers in 
Jezzine, southern Lebanon.190 In the coming decades, FST was adopted by at least 16 other groups, 
including the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which con-
ducted an estimated 26-75 female attacks between 1994 and 2009; the Black Widows of the Chechen 
rebels, which carried out 26 attacks from 2001 to 2013; Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ); Hamas; and 
al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI), which under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi carried out between 50-174 attacks in 
the mid-2000s.191 Yet by the end of February 2018, Boko Haram almost exceeded these groups’ female 
suicide attacks combined, through incidents involving single, double, and multiple bombers. In August 
2017, Warner and Matfess additionally noted that Boko Haram, which first used a male bomber in 
2011, was reliant on female bombers in preference to males.192 
Boko Haram’s use of FST is prolific. The data shows that Boko Haram deployed 469 female suicide 
bombers in 240 total incidents from June 2014 to the end of February 2018, killing an estimated 1,259 
people (bombers excluded), 1,673 people (bombers included), and injuring 2,967 more people (see 
189 Margaret Gonzalez-Perez, “The False Islamization of Female Suicide Bombers,” Gender Issues 28:1-2 (2011): p. 62.
190  Mehaidli is remembered today as “Bride of the South,” a legacy she left through a video martyrdom message in which she justified 
the attack. See Mia Bloom, Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terrorists (London: Hurst, 2011), p. 23.
191  Claudia Brunner, “Female Suicide Bombing,” in Jill Steans and Daniela Tepe-Belfrage eds., Handbook on Gender in World Politics 
(Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), p. 215; Bloom, Bombshell, p. 216; Yoram Schweitzer, “Introduction,” in 
Yoram Schweitzer ed., Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2006), p. 8. Figures vary due to 
discrepancies in criteria used in counting incidents as well as the inclusion/exclusion of failed attacks.
192 Warner and Matfess, p. 28.
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Figure 1).193 Most incidents affect Nigeria (179, 75% of attacks), with the majority of those in Borno 
State (133, 55% of attacks). The second-most affected area, the Far North of Cameroon (48, 20% of 
attacks), has experienced almost as many attacks as the rest of Nigeria. Chad has seen six attacks (2%) 
and Niger seven (3%). The female suicide bombers are scarcely identified by name in the press, nor 
are their basic demographic details provided. In the majority of reported cases (53%, 250 bombers), 
the attacker’s age is not stated. However, media reports describe 29% (136) as “teenagers” (13-19 years, 
i.e. including some adults), and 6% (29 so-called “bombers”) as younger girl children. Only 12% (54 
people) were reportedly “adult,” perhaps because age is only mentioned if attackers are perceived as 
very young. The engagement of minors suggests existing definitions of “suicide terrorism,” which 
emphasize bomber complicity, cannot easily be applied.194 While this chapter uses the terminology of 
existing literature on suicide bombing/bombers/terrorism, it is important not to assume that a Boko 
Haram “attacker” is always complicit or even “self-aware” during attacks.
Scholars seeking to understand FST in other groups typically adopt a multi-level approach, consid-
ering individual, societal, organizational (strategic and tactical), and ideological factors, which may 
193 See footnote 187 for notes on data collection.
194 See, for example, the definition offered by Yoram Schweitzer, “Suicide Terrorism: Development & Characteristics,” in A Lecture 
Presented in the International Conference on Countering Suicide Terrorism, February 21, 2000.
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Figure 1: Suspected Boko Haram female suicide attacks by month
overlap.195 Contrasted with male suicide attacks, FST has been subject to greater analysis at the in-
dividual level. This is due in part to bias tending to frame female violence as apolitical and assuming 
more personal motivations; additionally, some primary source interviews emphasize motivations such 
as loss or revenge.196 There is little academic data on the motivations of Boko Haram female suicide 
bombers. Journalists frequently cite coercion, with many accounts from women and girls who have 
refused to detonate devices.197 Some 4,826 females including 2,438 children have reportedly been 
arrested for links to Boko Haram—more females than males.198 It is unclear how many were bombers, 
and how many were coerced into Boko Haram, as few personal stories are known. The data in this 
chapter cannot offer personal motivations; it can only reveal patterns.
These patterns are consistent with organizational-level analysis that explains FST in terms of tactical 
and strategic advantage for a terrorist movement.199 FST has five key advantages. First, the ‘shock 
value’ of initial use of female attackers may ensure publicity and therefore have a propaganda effect. 
Second, women and girls can have easier access to targets because females are less often “suspected, 
inspected, or detected” as attackers.200 This can be especially true in Islamic societies where there are 
strong social barriers to predominantly male security officers subjecting Muslim women to checks.201 
This ultimately renders FST a short-term tactic since security forces can and do adapt.202 Third, the 
use of female suicide attackers avoids disrupting predominantly male lines of leadership, particularly if 
men see women as “burdensome.”203 Fourth, militant groups suffering shortages of male recruits amid, 
for example, an intensification of external pressures can resort to FST in an act of “desperation.”204 
Fifth, FST can be used to shame men to fight.205
Organizational capacity and strategic motivations also impact when and why groups use suicide 
bombing. Pape suggests suicide terrorism is a matter of “strategic logic,” aimed at coercing liberal de-
mocracies out of territorial occupation.206 While rigorously challenged,207 his research was significant 
in deemphasizing the role of religion and emphasizing strategy. Yet religious ideology has been central 
195  Mohammed M. Hafez, “Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis 
and Illustrative Case Study,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29:2 (2006): p. 166.
196  Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 145; Patricia Pearson (1997) 
cited in Jeffrey P. Rush and Elizabeth Schafluetzel-Iles, “Fem Fatales: The Evolution and Significance of Female Involvement in 
Terrorist Networks and Suicide Bombing,” Professional Issues in Criminal Justice 2:1 (2007): p. 60; Karen Jacques and Paul J. Taylor, 
“Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different Reasons?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31:4 (2008): pp. 304–326; 
Bloom, Bombshell.
197 See, for instance, Ruth Maclean, “Dressed for Death: The Women Boko Haram Sent to Blow Themselves Up,” Guardian, May 5, 2017; 
Dionne Searcey, “Boko Haram Strapped Suicide Bombs to Them. Somehow These Teenage Girls Survived,” New York Times, October 
25, 2017.
198  Olatunji Omirin, “Army parades 3 female bombers, 8 foreigners,” Daily Trust, March 2, 2017.
199  Gonzalez-Perez; Debra D. Zedalis, “Female Suicide Bombers,” Strategic Studies Institute, June 2004.
200  Jacob Zenn cited in Morgan Winsor, “Boko Haram Enlists Female Suicide Bombers To Kill 100,000; Violence Now Akin To ISIS,” 
International Business Times, December 6, 2014.
201 David Cook and Olivia Allison, Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith and Politics of Martyrdom Operations 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), p. 134; Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill (New York: Columbia University Press; New Ed 
edition, 2007) p. 108.
202 Jeffrey William Lewis, The Business of Martyrdom (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), p. 255. 
203 Jessica Davis, “Evolution of the Global Jihad: Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36:4 (2013): p. 288; 
Lewis, p. 138.
204 Cindy D. Ness, “In the Name of the Cause: Women’s Work in Secular and Religious Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28:5 
(2005): p. 357; Brigitte L. Nacos, “The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of 
Women in Politics and in Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28:5 (2005): p. 436.
205  Bloom, Bombshell; Anne Speckhard, “The Emergence of Female Suicide Terrorists,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31:11 (2008); 
Davis, pp. 284, 288; Ness, p. 357; Nacos, p. 436; Lewis, p. 138.
206 Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97:3 (2003): p. 355.
207 Assaf Moghadam, “Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 29:8 (2006): p. 707.
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to moral and theological arguments by salafi-jihadi groups encouraging male suicide bombing, and 
prohibiting female violence. For example, female suicide bombers will in death reveal their bodies, and 
unaccompanied, young and ‘attractive’ females are not permitted among men. This is despite historical 
precedent for the female fighter from the time of the Prophet Muhammed.208 Indeed, the requirements 
of defensive jihad do not, in theory, disbar women.209 Nonetheless, leading ideologues, including Ab-
dullah Azzam, Anwar al-Awlaki, and Usama bin Ladin, as well as influential Islamist scholars such 
as Abu Basir al-Tartusi and Abu Umar as-Sayf have repeatedly refused to sanction violent jihad for 
women.210 In particular, al-Qa`ida Central was always unwilling to condone female suicide bombers,211 
a legacy that the Islamic State maintained until the summer of 2017 and the fall of Mosul.212 
Gonzalez-Perez argues that in the exceptional cases where FST has been used by Islamist groups, it 
is rarely more than a tactically opportunistic act. For example, in Palestine, Hamas followed PIJ in 
permitting female suicide bombers, which in turn had followed al-Fatah. Competition between the 
groups to recruit Palestinian women prompted the spread of the tactic.213 When al-Zarqawi instituted 
a campaign of female suicide bombing for AQI in the mid-2000s, he knowingly challenged AQI doc-
trine. He exploited local patriarchal dynamics to engage minors and women into tactically expedient 
attacks, without even justifying them theologically or allowing martyrdom videos.214 His aim was to 
shame men into action and innovate regionally. His tactic quickly became predominant.215 With FST, 
as Brachman notes of terrorism, “winning comes first.”216
Boko Haram might share this motto, and indeed Shekau has openly sought to emulate al-Zarqawi. 
Analysis of the FST data until the cut-off date of the end of February 2018 reveals five distinct waves 
(see Figure 1),217 each giving the movement a particular tactical advantage as internal and external 
(military) pressures change.218 Waves are identified through either a clear gap in suicide bombing 
campaigns (Waves One to Two, Two to Three, and Four to Five) or a significant regional shift (Wave 
Three to Four, which is contiguous in time). The shifts can be contextualized with knowledge of 
internal and external dynamics and events. Analysis of “waves,” therefore, yields more insight into 
FST’s evolution as a tactic than analysis of specific “years” because looking at years renders invisible 
significant changes in bombing patterns occurring within years. For instance, Figure 2, which shows 
casualties per bomber by years reveals a steadily uniform decline, while patterns by waves indicate a 
more complex dynamic. 
208 Cook and Allison, p. 130; Nelly Lahoud, “The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ Exclusion of Women From Jihad,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 26:5 (2014): pp. 780-802.
209 Lahoud, “Neglected Sex,” p. 792; David Cook, “Women Fighting in Jihad?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28:5 (2005), p. 376; Farhana 
Qazi, “The Mujahidaat: Early Female Warriors of Islam;” in Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry eds., Women, Gender and Terrorism 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2011), pp. 33-35; Davis, pp. 279-291.
210 Lahoud, “Neglected Sex;” William F. McCants ed., Militant Ideology Atlas (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006), 
99–106, 127–28.
211 Davis.
212 Jack Moore, “ISIS Unleashes Dozens of Female Suicide Bombers in Battle For Mosul,” Newsweek, July 5, 2017.
213 Gonzalez-Perez, p. 58.
214 Bloom, Bombshell, 209–11; Alexandra Zavis, “Grooming a Female Suicide Bomber - Latimes,” accessed Los Angeles Times, November 
11, 2017
215 Bloom, Bombshell, 210; Joby Warrick, Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS (New York: Doubleday, 2015), p. 271. 
216 Jarret M. Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice, first edition (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 82.
217 Data collection is ongoing. The end February point marks the final submission date of this chapter.
218 Elizabeth Pearson, “Nigeria’s Female Suicide Bombers: A Show of Strength,” War on the Rocks, October 16, 2014.
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Wave One: Publicity [7 attackers in 6 successful and 1 failed attack: See Figure 5 for locations] 
The first wave, which took place in June and July 2014, saw six female suicide attacks in two months, 
and one other arrest, of a young girl wearing a suicide vest in Katsina State. Targets were diverse: a 
military barracks, educational facilities, a market, and a gas depot. As first noted in 2015, and reem-
phasized by Warner and Matfess, this may have been an opportunistic ‘publicity wave,’ capitalizing 
on the global interest in Boko Haram following the Chibok kidnappings of more than 270 schoolgirls 
in April 2014.219 Fatalities and injuries per attack, all engaging single (lone) bombers, were low (2.2 
fatalities and 5.7 injuries) (see Figure 3). However, the impact was amplified by the timing, with fears 
that the female suicide bombers were ‘Chibok girls.’ At the same time, Boko Haram made incursions in 
northeastern Nigeria and acquired towns and destroyed roads and bridges, largely out of the spotlight 
of the media, ahead of Shekau’s August 2014 declaration of a Dawla Islamiyyah. 
219 Elizabeth Pearson, “Boko Haram and Nigeria’s Female Bombers,” RUSI Newsbrief 35:5 (2015): p. 20; Warner and Matfess, p. 24.
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Figure 2: Casualties per bomber, per wave and per year
Wave Two: Innovation [38 attackers in 18 successful and 10 failed attacks] A clear gap of three 
months followed Wave One, until November 7, 2014, when a second wave commenced that lasted 
until March 10, 2015. The wave spanned the postponement of the presidential elections scheduled for 
February 14, 2015, until the acceptance of Shekau’s pledge to al-Baghdadi on March 7, 2015, and the 
Nigerian and sub-regional offensive against the insurgents, which commenced on March 8, 2015.220 
The wave almost trebled fatalities per attack through a number of innovations. Firstly, although reli-
ant on single attacks, this wave introduced tandem female suicide bombings; secondly, active attacks 
used children and young girls for the first time; and thirdly, the geographical reach of the attacks 
spread to Borno State and two female suicide attacks were in Niger near the Nigerian border, as well 
as incorporating Bauchi, Gombe, Kano, Taraba, and Yobe states. This wave represented a highly ef-
fective response to security checkpoints instituted in Nigeria late in 2014 because child female suicide 
bombers were able to subvert military expectations and gain access to soft targets, such as markets, 
which accounted for 62% of targets in this wave. 
Wave Three: Resistance [32 attackers in 16 successful and 2 failed attacks] Following a temporary 
cease in FST due to the Nigerian and sub-regional military offensive, which put Boko Haram under 
significant pressure, the militants launched Wave Three from May 2015 to July 2015. This wave shifted 
220 “Islamic State ‘accepts’ Boko Haram’s Allegiance Pledge,” BBC, March 15, 2013; “Allies Begin Push against Boko Haram,” BBC, March 
8, 2015.
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focus to security targets (at 22% of Wave Three attacks, now equal to markets) and also included three 
mosques and a church. Boko Haram continued to innovate, with three attackers or more a feature 
of attacks, and single attacks now 60% of all incidents, down from 71% in Wave Two (see Figure 4). 
Women were sometimes teamed with men. The increase in bombers per attack was effective in in-
creasing fatalities per attack during this period, although by a relative small increment (7.6 per attack 
from 6.25). Although under sustained pressure, Boko Haram maintained the FST offensive. This wave 
saw attacks in Borno, Kaduna, Kano, and Yobe states.
 
Wave Four: Retrenchment [167 attackers in 56 successful and 26 failed attacks] The fourth wave 
commenced in July 2015 and did not ease until the end of May 2016. This wave is differentiated from 
Wave Three through, first, the predominance of multiple female suicide attackers, with for the first 
time more tandem attacks than single attacks (see Figure 4); and second, with a new geographic focus 
in the Far North of Cameroon, which saw 28 attacks (34%), Chad, which saw six attacks (7%), and 
Niger, which saw two attacks (2%). This was likely a result of Boko Haram relocating its bases as the 
Nigerian Army cleared territory formerly held by the insurgents in northeastern Nigeria. Attacks, 
however, demonstrated not expansion, but retrenchment around a reduced geographical space fo-
cused on Borno State and the border areas with its neighbors. While fatalities per attack were slightly 
reduced in this wave, the reliance on multiple attackers succeeded in almost doubling injuries per at-
tack (from 9.6 to 18). Female suicide attackers continued to predominantly target civilian areas (60% 
of attacks), such as markets (24%), bars, or restaurants, and from September 2015 began to assault 
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Figure 4: Number of bombers per attack, by waves and by year
camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (8%). These are easily accessible locations to female 
suicide bombers, given the high proportion of women and children in camps.221 Some 14% of attacks 
impacted government, political, and security targets. Military action to combat FST, however, meant 
a high number of failed attacks, with 26 (16%) of Wave Four bombers shot. This means that in 15% of 
attacks, the target was unclear.
Boko Haram’s use of FST almost disappeared between May and October 2016. There were only two 
attacks through June to September, and all four bombers in this ‘gap’ period were shot. Boko Haram 
faced numerous challenges at this time. For example, a key bomb-maker was arrested in late May 
2016, and there were also factional struggles within the movement.222 Boko Haram splinter group 
Ansaru saw Khalid al-Barnawi arrested in April 2016, and the Islamic State replaced Shekau as West 
Africa Province leader in August 2016 and installed as the new leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the 
reported son of former Boko Haram leader Muhammed Yusuf. Al-Barnawi disapproved of Shekau’s 
targeting of innocent Muslims in attacks. An arrested insurgent commander has also suggested dis-
agreement on Shekau’s use of girl children as bombers was a source of tension between Boko Haram 
leaders that eventually led to splits.223 
Wave Five: Factionalization [174 attackers in 41 successful and 39 failed attacks] The Fifth Wave 
of female suicide attacks is evident since October 2016 and is ongoing and centered on Borno State (76 
attacks, 74%) and its capital, Maiduguri (55 attacks, 54%), with a maintained presence in Cameroon, 
including 20 attacks there in this period (19%). It coincides with Shekau’s attempt to reassert his status 
after being deposed as the Boko Haram wali (“governor”) in August 2016, an announcement he pub-
licly contested.224 IDPs remain a focus (17%) of attacks, as do general attacks against civilians (21%), 
221 The majority of these attacks took place in 2016, amid the Nigerian government’s attempts to return 2.2 million internally displaced 
people.
222 “B’Haram Chief Bomb Maker Killed by Shekau’s Body Guard, Another Blinded,” THISDAYLIVE, May 23, 2016.
223 “Boko Haram Fracturing over Islamic State Ties, U.S. General Warns,” Reuters, June 21, 2016; “Ex-Boko Haram Intelligence Chief 
Speaks on Shekau, Albarnawi, Others,” Premium Times, December 24, 2017.
224 Abdulkareem Haruna, “In new video, Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, threatens to attack Buhari in presidential villa,” Premium 
Times, August 8, 2016.
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Figure 5: Map of waves
with continuing pressure on security targets (14%). While ongoing, this wave is the least effective, 
mirroring Wave One. This likely reflects movement fragmentation; Shekau’s reduced status; increased 
military activity, including the ‘interception’ of bombers; reduced fighter numbers; and possibly less 
materials and expertise. Some 18% of Wave Five bombers (39) have been shot and a number of others 
have aborted attacks prior to detonation. For a variety of reasons, therefore, half of the attacks have 
been failures, and 25% of intended targets impossible to identify. 
As a result, the Fifth Wave has seen average fatalities per attack halved, from 7.3 to 3.3—and per at-
tacker from 3.6 to 1.5. Despite a continued reliance on multiple bombers, this wave has been unable, 
as was possible in prior waves, to utilize multiple bomber “teams” to maintain casualties per attack, at 
the expense of casualties per attacker. 
Matfess and Warner suggest Boko Haram suicide bombing (male and female) per bomber is less ef-
fective than for other groups, pointing to the decreased lethalities year on year.225 (See also Figure 2.) 
However, a consideration of “waves” over “years” offers a different interpretation of the effectiveness 
of Boko Haram’s female suicide bombings. Firstly, when considering “waves” of attacks, the decline 
becomes dramatic only in Wave Five, in which Shekau is no longer ISWAP wali. Here, the impact is 
similar to Wave One. The military offensive clearly impacted FST efficacy, particularly in terms of 
geographical scope, but apparently not so dramatically as factionalization. Second, while it is true 
that average fatalities per Boko Haram female bomb attack across all incidents (excluding bombers) 
are at 5.5, which is lower than figures offered for other groups (11 mean average per mission in Mogh-
adam’s data of all groups using suicide terrorism, but rising to 23 when only salafi-jihadi groups are 
considered),226 the salient point about Boko Haram’s female bombing is its unprecedented prevalence. 
Lethality is only one measure of efficiency. Female suicide bombing data from West Africa reveals 
an onslaught of sustained attacks, the sheer frequency and unpredictability of which have impacted 
perceptions of security, particularly human security, in ways that are unmeasurable. A recent report 
suggests 86% of IDPs are “not ready to return” home as they are afraid.227 The Borno State government 
is considering plans for the concentration of security on urban settlements, practically ceding rural 
areas to the insurgents.228 FST has been an important tactic in achieving fear and communicating Boko 
Haram’s unrelenting endurance, even when under duress. Importantly, this undermines President 
Muhammadu Buhari’s December 2015 claims of the “technical defeat” of the insurgency. FST has 
effectively targeted the most vulnerable, such as IDPs, often using the most vulnerable. Low average 
lethalities notwithstanding, female suicide bombing has been effective in hugely amplifying the key 
effects of terrorism as a tactic: creating fear, sending a symbolic message to diverse audiences, killing 
civilians, and asserting power over governments and communities. 
Coercion and Symbolism in Boko Haram FST
Among other terrorist groups using FST, the symbolic power of the female bomber as a willing “mar-
tyr” has been key.229 In Chechnya, for example, the so-called “Black Widows” shared experiences of 
brutality and rape by Russian security forces to elicit public sympathy prior to their bombings.230 
By contrast, Boko Haram has not “capitalized” on female suicide deaths with martyrdom videos, or 
“wasiyeh,” which have in other terrorist groups elevated women as “poster-girls.” There is no evidence 
225 Warner and Matfess, pp. 10-11.
226 Assaf Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks,” International Security 33:3 
(2008): p. 49; Assaf Moghadam, “Shifting Trends in Suicide Attacks,” CTC Sentinel 2:1 (2009).
227 “Boko Haram: 86 Percent of Borno IDPs Not Willing to Return Home - Report,” Premium Times, October 12, 2017.
228 Paul Carsten and Ola Lanre, “Nigeria Puts Fortress Towns at Heart of New Boko Haram Strategy,” Reuters, December 3, 2017. 
229 Lewis, pp. 38, 253.
230 Lindsey A. O’Rourke, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?” Security Studies 18:4 (2009): p. 710.
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of Boko Haram using attacks to publicly promote female commitment to the cause, or garner sup-
port in local Muslim populations. A 2014 Pew Report found only 20% of Nigerians surveyed found 
the idea of suicide bombing justifiable, although this marked a rise on views in 2013, and a separate 
study showed Nigerian women in particular tend not to support terrorism.231 Studies of populations 
elsewhere additionally indicate increased moral outrage at the use of female violence in terrorism 
campaigns.232 Yet gaining support in local populations is historically among the main purposes of FST 
by other groups. Notably, however, al-Zarqawi, who initiated a wave of female suicide attacks against 
U.S. forces in Iraq in 2003-2008, also avoided martyrdom videos for women and girls, and did not 
even record their names.233 AQI also coerced female bombers into attacks, a factor familiar in reports 
of Boko Haram FST. Coercion renders meaningless theological justifications for jihad, and disturbs 
the narrative of martyrdom, which is by contrast central to Islamic State suicide operations. 
Primary knowledge of the identities of Boko Haram female suicide bombers is scant, as mentioned, 
and a literature on broader female involvement in the group is only gradually emerging. Research 
shows Boko Haram has routinely engaged in GBV, abusing and harassing both Muslim and Christian 
women in northeastern Nigeria. They have also instrumentally used women and girls well before the 
use of FST, for example, to recruit or to smuggle arms.234 There is growing evidence of the coercion of 
females into roles as suicide bombers, from NGO reports from women liberated from Boko Haram 
camps, the accounts of officials, and media interviews with young women who refused to self-deto-
nate.235 The methods and extent of this coercion vary. For instance, UNICEF suggests child attackers 
are 20% of the total bombers, and 75% of these are female.236 This chapter’s data suggests 29 female 
suicide bombers were pre-pubescent children (6%) and 136 (29%) teenagers. Minors cannot be under-
stood to legally consent, even if “willing.” Some stories reveal parents “donating” girls to Boko Haram. 
Zaharau Babangida, a 13-year-old girl who aborted an attack in Kano, described how her parents 
ordered her to join Boko Haram, which they supported. Another account of coercion comes from an 
adult, “Hauwa.” She willingly married an insurgent but after his death rejected the advances of another 
militant and was ordered to blow herself up. She refused.237 There are other complex accounts like 
theirs that “defy neat categories” and demonstrate a spectrum of agency.238 
Members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) and Operation Lafiya Dole command believe both 
hypnotism and enforced drug-use also coerce females to bomb. In 2016, a woman abducted in Maidu-
guri described how she and two other women were injected with a tranquilizer before being strapped 
with bombs.239 Eyewitnesses have also reported seeing men accompanying female suicide attackers 
to ensure they see through their task. Coerced remote detonation is possible, although U.N. reports 
231 “Concerns About Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East,” Pew Research Center, 2014, pp. 10-11; C. Christine Fair and Bryan 
Shepherd, “Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29:1 (2006): p. 58. 
232 O’Rourke, p. 692.
233 Bloom, Bombshell, 216.
234 Atta Barkindo, Benjamin Gudaku, and Caroline Wesley, “Our Bodies, Their Battleground: Boko Haram and Gender-Based Violence 
against Christian Women and Children in North-Eastern Nigeria since 1999,” Open Doors International, November 2013; Jacob 
Zenn and Elizabeth Pearson, “Women, Gender and the Evolving Tactics of Boko Haram,” Journal of Terrorism Research 5:1 (2014); 
Chitra Nagarajan, “Gender Assessment of Northeast Nigeria,” February 2018, for Managing Conflict North East Nigeria (MCN), via 
chitrasudhanagarajan.wordpress.com.
235 Author interview, Civilian Joint Task Force Member, Borno, February 2016; author interview, Air Commodore Dele Alonge, Spokesman 
Operation Lafiya Dole, February 2016; Freedom C. Onuoha and Temilola A. George, “Boko Haram’s Use of Female Suicide Bombing in 
Nigeria,” Al Jazeera Center For Studies, 2015.
236 “Bad Blood,” UNICEF and International Alert, February 2016, p. 2.
237 “13-Year-Old Girl, Teenage Suicide Bomber Confesses ‘Boko Haram Told Me I’ll Enter Paradise If I Blow Up Myself,’” Naijagists.com, 
December 25, 2014; Haruna Umar, “Nigerian Suicide Bomber Gets Cold Feet, Refuses to Kill,” Associated Press, February 12, 2016.
238 Christina Luchetta, “Motivations and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth,” Mercy Corps, 
April 8, 2016, p. 11.
239 “Boko Haram: Suicide Attack on Kano Market Aborted,” Today (Nigeria), May 22, 2016. 
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suggest this is less prevalent, as photographs of dead attackers reveal self-detonation via wristband.240 
Perhaps most compelling are the reported cases of GBV in aborted or prevented FST, in which females 
subsequently describe both threat and deception.241 A number of women and girls say insurgents told 
them they would be safe when they detonated, as in this account: “[He said] there are soldiers at a 
checkpoint over there. When you get there, see what you’ll press, when you press it – nothing will 
happen to you. The belt will disengage from your body – [so] go and harm the soldiers, don’t have 
any fear, just press it when you get there.”242 Other “failed” female suicide attackers report being paid 
for their attack, in one case as little as 200 Naira (60 cents); some are among the up to 2,000 women 
and children UNICEF estimates were abducted by Boko Haram between 2012 and February 2016.243 
Reports of the involvement of the kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls being used in FST are not thus far 
supported by evidence.244 
Analyzing FST through a multi-layered prism—societal, cultural, organizational, and personal—sit-
uates Boko Haram’s female operations more closely to other African conflicts, than to Islamic State 
practice.245 Conflicts in Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone have seen women abducted, raped, 
and forced into marriage and combat.246 The mass abduction of schoolgirls witnessed in Chibok was 
first seen in Uganda by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) under Joseph Kony.247 Such abductees, 
however, after time supported the LRA, finding agency and status, as has been reported in the case of 
some females taken by Boko Haram.248 Boko Haram’s abuses of women emerge partly from salafi-ji-
hadi interpretations of sharia and partly from entrenched patriarchal legal and social structures in 
the northeast, which can politically marginalize women and enable abuses of male power, even when 
women also feel they benefit from other aspects of Islam, and indeed sharia.249 They are likely also 
the result of simple criminality. However, they also follow local patterns of regional conflict, which 
as Turshen suggests, primarily seek to exploit and objectify women “for their assets, and as ‘assets’ in 
themselves.”250 Clearly such GBV in conflict has global resonances; but in the case of Boko Haram, 
there are shared regional particularities.
Additionally, Shekau, like al-Zarqawi before him, has instrumentalized religious and cultural narra-
tives to justify GBV, including FST, with little regard for the advice of others with greater theological 
knowledge. Justifying criticisms of Boko Haram sex slavery, for example, Shekau refutes rival leader 
240 Dionne Searcey, “Nigeria Vexed by Boko Haram’s Use of Women as Suicide Bombers,” New York Times, February 11, 2016.
241 Ibid.; author interview, Air Commodore Dele Alonge, 8 October, 2016.
242 Transcript from an interview of a young female Boko Haram ‘bomber,’ with thanks to Libération journalist Patricia Huon. Similar 
stories have emerged in author’s interviews with journalists who have talked to women who did not detonate. See also Patricia Huon, 
“Boko Haram : ‘Je Suis Étudiante, j’ai Une Bombe, n’approchez Pas,’” Libération, August 23, 2017.
243 It should be noted that men and boys are also forcibly recruited as fighters, or paid for their services. “Bad Blood;” Samuel Osborne, 
“Nigerian Woman Says Boko Haram Gave Her 50p to Carry out Suicide Bombing Attack,” Independent, February 8, 2017.
244 See Elizabeth Pearson and Jacob Zenn, “#BringBackOurGirls? Two Years After the Chibok Girls Were Taken, What Do We Know?” War 
on the Rocks, April 14, 2016, for discussion of the focus on FST and Chibok.
245 Lewis, p. 138.
246 Dyan Mazurana and Susan McKay, “Where are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique: 
Their Lives During and After war,” International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2004, pp. 11–17; Meredeth 
Turshen, “The Political Economy of Rape: An Analysis of Systematic Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women During Armed Conflict in 
Africa,” in C. Moser and F. Clarke eds., Victors, Perpetrators or Actors: Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence (London: Zen 
Books, 2001), p. 5.
247 Meredith Turshen, “The Political Economy of Violence against Women During Armed Conflict in Uganda,” Social Research 67:3 
(2000): pp. 811–12.
248 See Susan McKay, “Girls as ‘Weapons of Terror’ in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leonean Rebel Fighting Forces,” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism 28:5 (2005): pp. 385-397 and also Hilary Matfess, “Rescued and Deradicalised Women Are Returning to Boko Haram. 
Why?” African Arguments, November 1, 2017.
249 “Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency,” International Crisis Group, December 5, 2016, p. 2.
250 Turshen, “The Political Economy of Rape,” pp. 55-68; Chris Coulter, Mariam Persson, and Mats Utas, “Young Female Fighters in 
African Wars Conflict and Its Consequences,” Nordic Africa Institute, 2008.
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Mamman Nur on whether an apostate can be enslaved, where he says “they said, it is not permissi-
ble for me to capture women participating in democracy, to fight them or to handle them as slaves. 
I replied to them that I will continue to capture and sell them just as our predecessors did. This is 
my creed.”251 Shekau again presented a selective ideological justification for preferred tactics with a 
significant development on January 17, 2017, when he claimed a suicide attack on the University of 
Maiduguri, Borno State, reportedly involving a seven-year-old girl. Just two weeks before, he had 
warned the “battle was just beginning.”252 On January 17, he stated:
This is my message to you, we carried out the bombings and you saw a female detonate the bombs and 
this is done for a reason; but it is not in our creed for women to go to war but we know the reason God 
gave to us in his Book, when it warrants for a woman to do so; we know because you are not our tutors, 
the Quran is our teacher … a woman can do it when the need arises and it is there in the book of God.253 
Although there was a prior claim of a June 2014 suspected female vehicle suicide bombing in Apapa 
Wharf, Lagos, the University of Maiduguri explosion was the first female suicide bombing incident 
to be both explicitly claimed as such and “theologically justified” in public.254 This effectively stamped 
the tactic, and the ongoing Fifth Wave of attacks, with Shekau’s signature. Shekau and Boko Haram 
have not claimed 99% of overall attacks. No female suicide attacker has been eulogized as a fighter for 
God, unlike a handful of cases of Arabic-language claims of high-profile attacks by men/boys in Boko 
Haram. The “justification” of attacks by women, however, provides no back-story to the bomber, and 
no reference to her courage in fighting for Boko Haram, as has accompanied claims of male suicide 
attacks.255 Female suicide bombers have been accorded no symbolic value by the group.
Islamic State: Masculine Heroes, Territorial Aims, and the Challenge to Boko Haram
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria was defeated in 2017. One by one, the Islamic State lost key cities, 
including Mosul and the self-declared capital of the caliphate, Raqqa. It was in Mosul in July 2017 
that Iraqi television crews filmed a woman carrying a baby, catching the moment both explode.256 
Dozens of other female suicide bombers were soon reported, with profound implications. There had 
been previous rumors of Islamic State bombers in Turkey, of female “training groups” in Syria and 
Iraq, and news of female suicide bomber training among Libya-based Islamic State forces and Indo-
nesian pro-Islamic State cells.257 However, reports from Mosul appeared to demonstrate a reversal of 
the previous strict policy barring women from violence within Iraq and Syria, which is the ideological 
center of the Islamic State eschatology.258 After this, in October 2017, an article suggesting women had 
251 “Shekau responds to his Critics,” audio, December 2016, translated by Abdulbasit Kassim, with thanks to Kassim for allowing its 
inclusion.
252 Katie Mansfield, “Boko Haram - ‘The Battle is just beginning’ threatens leader in chilling new video,” Daily Express, January 3, 2017.
253 Shekau, January 17, 2017, transcript of YouTube audio claiming University of Maiduguri bombing, with thanks to Jacob Zenn.
254 In a number of reports, women and girls appear to be told missions are Islamically justified by Boko Haram members in camps.
255 For an alternative perspective, see also Mia Bloom and Hilary Matfess, “Women as Symbols and Swords in Boko Haram’s Terror - 
ProQuest,” Prism 6:1 (2016): pp. 104-121. Abba Ibrahim, “Sako Zuwa Ga Duniya (A Message to The World)!” YouTube, September 30, 
2012; “Adetutu Alao, Sako Zuwa Ga Jonathan 1_ Imam Abubakar Shekau.flv,” YouTube, January 11, 2012; Zenn and Pearson, “Women, 
Gender and the Evolving Tactics of Boko Haram.”
256 “Suicide Attacks amid ‘final’ Mosul Battle,” BBC, July 4, 2017; “Female Suicide Bomber Cradles Baby Moments before Blowing Them 
Both Up,” Independent, July 9, 2017.
257 Constanze Letsch, “Pregnant Istanbul Suicide Bomber Was Russian Citizen,” Guardian, January 16, 2015; “Inside the female jihadist 
training group: Female fanatics chant as they are trained to use assault rifles (though they’re making at least one firearms blunder),” 
Daily Mail, April 10, 2015.
258 Bel Trew, “Isis Sends Women into Battle in Libya,” Times, February 29, 2016; Haeril Halim, Arya Dipa, Ganug Nugroho Adi, and 
Suherdjoko, “Women Playing Greater Role in Terrorism,” Jakarta Post, December 16, 2016; Simon Cottee and Mia Bloom, “The Myth 
of the ISIS Female Suicide Bomber,” Atlantic, September 8, 2017; Elizabeth Pearson, “Why Female Suicide Bombers Mean the End of 
ISIS’s Caliphate Dream,” Newsweek, July 18, 2017.
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a duty to participate in “all forms of jihad” appeared in the official Islamic State newspaper al-Naba,259 
suggesting another shift toward tactics of female violence already instituted in the Islamic State West 
Africa Province (ISWAP). Then in February 2018, a propaganda video citing al-Zarqawi appeared in 
which women with guns were shown shooting in a battle to “avenge the chaste women,” in a “new era” 
of war.260 The collapse of the caliphate in Syria and Iraq seemed to signal the collapse of the Islamic 
State prohibition on female violence.261
Initial academic skepticism rightly followed.262 Media obsession with myths of violent female “jihadis” 
had led to prior false alarms.263 Although Islamic State predecessor AQI, as mentioned, used female 
suicide bombers under al-Zarqawi, al-Baghdadi effectively closed this chapter of the Islamic State’s 
history when in February 2015 he catalyzed Jordan’s execution of the last imprisoned attempted fe-
male suicide bomber from that era, Sajida al-Rishawi.264 Instead, al-Baghdadi emulated al-Qa`ida 
Central’s exclusive use of male suicide terrorism as symbolic elevation. Under bin Ladin, the narrative 
of altruistic “hero-martyr” was instrumentalized to mobilize communities, who revered bombers as 
public heroes. By fostering group approval and admiration for male suicide bombing, al-Qa`ida was 
better able to recruit bombers and realize the group’s operational goals.265 
The Islamic State under al-Baghdadi expanded al-Qa`ida’s doctrine of a strictly gendered ideology 
with a “culture of male militancy.”266 At the backbone of Islamic State governance was a gendered “dou-
ble binary” that first distinguished the roles of Islamic State men (constructed as warriors/combatants/
state-builders) from Islamic State women (constructed as mothers/wives) and, second, distinguished 
the Islamic State’s “own women” from “enemy, or ‘infidel,’ women” (constructed as the spoils of war/
slaves). The gender binary of the Islamic State men/women is hierarchical: warrior culture, and in par-
ticular male suicide bombing, or istishhadi, represented the highest status, or ‘hegemonic’ masculine 
role within the group.267 This followed bin Ladin, who put male martyrdom at the heart of al-Qa`ida’s 
ideology when he declared to the West “these young men love death as you love life.” 
The power of this gender binary and the high status of male martyrdom in the worldwide recruitment 
of male suicide attackers cannot be underestimated. A reported 27,000-31,000 foreign fighters trav-
eled from 86 countries to join the Islamic State.268 Many of the new Islamic State male warrior-citizens 
did so as aspiring martyrs. Martyrdom reportedly commanded a waiting list of eager young men, 
willing to use bribes to reach its top. Photographs posted online depicted dead martyrs in a Photo-
shopped state of ecstasy, with male suicide attacks publicly claimed in Islamic State “round-ups” of 
259 “Islamic State Calls on Female Supporters to Take Part in ‘Jihad,’” Middle East Eye, October 6, 2017.
260 Dearden.
261 Charlie Winter and Devorah Margolin, “The Mujahidat Dilemma: Female Combatants and the Islamic State,” CTC Sentinel 10:7 (2017).
262 Cottee and Bloom.
263 Just one example was evident in reports of a female suicide bomber in Paris in 2015. “Paris Attacks: Woman ‘was Not Suicide 
Bomber’ in Raid,” BBC, November 20, 2015.
264 “Jordan Executes Sajida Al-Rishawi after Pilot Murder,” Al Arabiya, February 4, 2015. This was in response to the Islamic State 
immolation of a captured Jordanian pilot and appears to be a calculated action by al-Baghdadi, knowing al-Rishawi’s execution was 
likely. 
265 Lewis, p. 11; Shaun Best, “Liquid Terrorism: Altruistic Fundamentalism in the Context of Liquid Modernity,” Sociology 44:4 (2010): pp. 
678-694; Liz Sly, “Al-Qaeda Backs Away from Radical Fighters in Syria, Iraq,” Washington Post, February 3, 2014; Bloom, Bombshell, 
210-212; Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and Ash-Sham,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 16 
(2014); O’Rourke, p. 697.
266 Nelly Lahoud, “Can Women Be Soldiers of the Islamic State?” Survival 59:1 (2017): pp. 61–78.
267 R. W. Connell and J. W. Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept,” Gender & Society 19:6 (2005): pp. 
829–859.
268 “An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq,” Soufan Group, December 2015, p. 4.
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the activities across its provinces.269 
Men’s high-status role as warriors and bombers was propagandized alongside an opposing narrative 
of the empowerment of women through the domestic setting. This provided strong regulation around 
the gender binary (male violence/female non-violence) for citizens’ behavior in the fledgling State. One 
of the most important English-language vehicles for the articulation of the roles of men and women 
was the (now discontinued) Islamic State propaganda magazine Dabiq. Editions included articles 
explicitly for women. Dabiq Issue 11 “A Jihad Without Fighting” is typical. It both acknowledges and 
admonishes the women who wish to fight and bomb: “My Muslim sister, indeed you are a mujahidah, 
and if the weapon of the men is the assault rifle and the explosive belt, then know that the weapon of 
the women is good behavior and knowledge.” Even where female violence appears to be condoned in 
Islamic State ideology, as for example in Dabiq Issue 13, which praises husband and wife Syed Rizwan 
Farook and Tashfeen Malik for their San Bernardino, California, shooting that killed 13 people, the 
intention is not to encourage other women to action, but to shame men to fight instead.
Analysis of the now-defunct Dabiq shows how it regularly and explicitly reinforced the gender binary 
in theological terms, through representations of both men and women. Dabiq provides four key rep-
resentations of women, all of which validate male violence and delegitimize female. First, women are 
victims, whose abuse by the enemy justifies men’s jihad to both avenge and protect them.270 Second, 
women are depicted as symbolically sanctified mothers and sisters and incubators of the next gener-
ation. While men’s existence as fighters was precarious, it was the women who represented baqiya, or 
permanence.271 This message was intended for both women and men.272 For example, the al-Khansaa 
Brigade’s Arabic-language manifesto aimed at Saudi Arabian women emphasized the “hallowed” do-
mestic role of Islamic State women and “divine duty of motherhood” as opposed to the “beauty salon 
culture,” hypocritical feminism and consumerism of the West, where women have forgotten their 
“fundamental” role and men are “emasculated” through women’s self-reliance. The manifesto states 
of the Islamic State woman, “The greatness of her position, the purpose of her existence is the Divine 
duty of motherhood.” This feminine sanctity, contrasted with Western women’s immorality, aimed 
both to attract disenchanted foreign women to the Islamic State, and then regulate their behavior 
when there.273 
Third, the status of Islamic State women is defined not only against men, but against “enemy women,” 
who may be enslaved according to their interpretation of the Qur’an, creating a double gender binary. 
Enslavement, which plays a central ideological role in the Islamic State’s state project, represents a 
complete erasure of the agency of female slaves and therefore any perceived violation of their rights, le-
gitimizing GBV. Dabiq Issue 4 “The Failed Crusade” outlines the fate awaiting captured Yazidi women, 
according to the dhimmi laws of the second Caliph governing the rights of Christians and Jews. While 
the payment of jizya, a religious tax, protects adherents of Christianity and Judaism (“People of the 
269 Katherine E. Brown, “Gender in the Apocalyptic and Utopian Thinking of Daesh,” King’s College, February 8, 2016; Rob Virtue, “Islamic 
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Book”), Yazidi women are treated as mushrikat, believers in a deity that is not God. The Islamic State 
therefore justifies their enslavement in ideological terms; however, videos of ‘slave markets,’ online 
discussion between men, and testimonies by Yazidi women of their abuse indicate that the realities of 
enslavement are less often representations of piety, and more often simple criminal rape and abuse.274 
The Islamic State persists, however, and gives slavery ideological meaning as a symbolic God-given 
institution, because “one of the signs of the Hour [was] that ‘the slave girl gives birth to her master.’” 
Slavery is therefore eulogized as part of the apocalyptic project, with the sexual lives of citizens as much 
the domain of the Islamic State as their public lives. These narratives are again instrumentalized to 
attract men to the Islamic State, and also appeal to women, even while they may resist their husbands 
raping slave women, or indeed taking a second wife.
Fourth, propaganda ensured women served as their own police. The state made public the roles re-
quired of men and women and regulated and enforced women’s behavior according to these narratives, 
with the gender binary serving as a litmus test of the smooth functioning of Islamic State governance. 
Every citizen of the state, whatever their country of origin, was made aware of these rules, codified by 
the Islamic State’s sharia laws, which served as a unifying feature of the political and physical space. 
Vast billboards forbade the display of skin, of see-through clothing, of tight or masculine clothes, per-
fume, of patterned or branded clothes, of clothes that might distract male observers.275 Women meted 
out brutal punishment for female transgressions of these rules as readily as men, as for example in 
the all-women al-Khansaa Brigade.276 Women were also encouraged to police one another online.277
Strict maintenance of this gendered bifurcation of roles, or what Guidère calls the “theology of sex-
uality,” was ostensibly ideological, but also strategic. It served a fundamentally organizational role 
for the Islamic State, which is committed to eternal military conflict until the Apocalypse. As noted, 
Islamist theology need not deny women violent roles. Nor can the Islamic State be analyzed solely in 
terms of ideology.278 The strict gender binary of Islamic State propaganda allowed action to be justified 
through reference to ideology, but also strategically supported Islamic State material aims in three 
ways: first, the international recruitment of much needed male fighters and women citizens through 
the symbolic meaning of each gender’s role; second, the regulation of citizens and institutions in the 
caliphate through the repeated articulation of its fundamental rules in gendered terms, enabling 
the production of Islamic State male fighter-citizens far into the future; and third, unification of the 
30,000 fighters and female migrants of many nationalities through shared ideological boundaries 
and the repeated public display of the rules of Islamic State sharia laws. This was crucial for social 
cohesion, as a significant proportion of Islamic State fighters were from non-Muslim and secular lands 
(Dar al-kuffar), and in fulfilling the promise that all Muslims were equal in this new land. The binary 
was also fundamental to the highly bureaucratized systems of the new “warrior State” and, as Lahoud 
has emphasized, there was therefore an “ideological cost” in any Islamic State move to permit female 
fighters.279 The frequent articulation of the deeply entrenched binary to a global audience created its 
own constraint, limiting the Islamic State from engaging FST without challenging its state project. 
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However, without a functioning state project, the strategic need to adhere to the binary as a unifying, 
recruiting, and regulating system was removed. Winter and Margolin have drawn attention to the ways 
in which the Islamic State has been dismantling the binary and preparing for a phase in which they can 
instrumentalize female violence.280 It was through strict gender division of violence that the emerging 
caliphate was united; as it collapses, so do its ideological structures. Calls for female non-violence or 
as appears the case now, female violence, show the boundaries between the two are strategic after all. 
So, too, for Boko Haram. 
Boko Haram and the Islamic State: Comparisons 
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has been adapting its doctrine on female suicide bombing and vi-
olence to its new situation. Such adaptation had been evident however for months in other Provinces, 
suggesting that “outposts” of Islamic State are on a looser ideological leash. Female suicide bombers 
allied to groups sympathetic to the Islamic State have been arrested in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and 
Pakistan, and deployed in Libya.281 However, the only wilaya with prolific use of FST is West Africa 
Province, where Boko Haram’s campaign as outlined in Sections I and II represented an exception 
to the carefully managed gendered binaries of jihad previously fostered by the Islamic State. Boko 
Haram’s FST contradicted the aims, meanings, and symbolism of martyrdom in the caliphate, as 
well as the majority view of salafi-jihadi scholars that women should neither fight nor engage in sui-
cide bombings. It transgressed the “double binary” of the Islamic State gender doctrine and instead, 
effectively merged male and female roles. Until the demotion of Shekau in August 2016, however, 
Islamic State leadership appears to have tacitly endorsed his FST campaign. Rather than criticize 
Boko Haram for challenging its gendered ideology, the Islamic State instead emphasized high-profile 
actions that apparently cohered with it, such as the abduction and “sale” of the Chibok schoolgirls, 
which was praised in Dabiq Issue 8 “Shari’ah Alone Will Rule Africa.”282 Additionally, ISWAP suicide 
attack numbers published by the Islamic State appear to have included female suicide attacks, or they 
would be even more inaccurate. Boko Haram FST, meanwhile, revealed the Islamic State’s ideological 
inconsistencies and raised the possibility of female violence in Iraq and Syria, which became a reality. 
The differences in approaches from 2014-2017 lie in the differing aims, objectives, and local contexts 
of each group. The three organizational goals of the Islamic State’s state project (international recruit-
ment, regulation, and unification), which were achieved through the Islamic State’s well-propagan-
dized gender binary in which only male violence was legitimized, are absent in Boko Haram, which 
had no “state.” Importantly, Boko Haram has never maintained long-term systems of governance 
beyond rudimentary sharia court punishments and mediation between Boko Haram fighters and 
villagers under their control. The Islamic State inherited sophisticated governance systems, complex 
infrastructure, and urban centers, and it successfully held and governed some territories for sustained 
periods. Parts of northeastern Nigeria conversely have a history of poor governance.283 Boko Haram 
formally held territories there only briefly, although much land is still inaccessible, had no urban cen-
ters and its own insurgency had, in fact, destroyed much infrastructure. 
First, therefore, Boko Haram has not needed to “sell” its message to a global audience of foreign fight-
ers or female “citizens;” rather, its recruitment pool has always been comprised of traffickers, paid male 
280 See Winter and Margolin.
281 See, for example, Charlie Campbell, “ISIS Unveiled: The Story Behind Indonesia’s First Female Suicide Bomber,” Time, March 3, 2017; 
Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Probes Detained IS Female Suicide Bomber Who Planned to Assault Christians,” VOA, April 17, 2017; “IS uses 
female suicide bombers in Sirte,” Libya Herald, December 2, 2016; “Bangladesh Police Arrests 4 Women Militants of JMB,” Indian 
Express, September 5, 2016.
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Chicago Press, 2016; Kindle edition), position 103. 
PEARSON MAY 2018
49
B O KO  H A R A M  B E YO N D  T H E  H E A D L I N E S
fighters, forced male conscripts, spouses and kin of pre-existing members, alongside the ideologically 
motivated fighters, most of whom are from the Lake Chad sub-region.284 Nor does Boko Haram need 
to recruit foreign women to populate its territories in northeastern Nigeria. Again demonstrating 
the importance of assuming nothing regarding female agency and Boko Haram, local women were 
reportedly early supporters of the group, particularly as a means to gain religious knowledge, or mar-
riage.285 Journalist Ahmed Salkida, who has written extensively on the movement, suggested in Feb-
ruary 2016 “there are [now] more women than men [in Boko Haram], since it is the men that are in 
the battle front.”286 Boko Haram is known to consolidate networks through marriages of widows to 
other members, suggesting women and men may share convictions.287 Wives have anecdotally taken 
part in violence alongside their husbands, although it is not believed they are routinely fighting.288 
Additionally, there has been one media report of the discovery of the body of a female fighter, and 
Nagarajan reports in Adamawa women sometimes take up arms, but this is not the norm.289 A Mercy 
Corps report suggests women may burn buildings during raids, but female members mostly occupy 
domestic roles, rarely also teaching or preaching.290 Nor are women apparent in videos of Boko Haram 
members fighting. Women have, though, reportedly been active in organizational roles, such as the 
“female wing” arrested in June 2014, suspected of recruiting new members and spies.291 Boko Haram’s 
international messaging, however, has mainly focused on women as victims of its power, as with videos 
boasting of the Chibok abductions.
Second, Boko Haram has not formalized its gendered ideology. Ladbury et al. stress that Shekau’s 
sharia, as opposed to that of the Islamic State, was nowhere clearly articulated, and there was, there-
fore, no coherent manifesto for governing a Nigerian ‘caliphate.’292 Boko Haram’s vision of “state” was 
a shadow of that of the Islamic State. Lacking a repeated formal articulation of a gendered manifesto, 
the constraints of the strict gender ideology seen in the Islamic State are absent, leaving Boko Haram 
less constrained and more able to shape its gender ideology according to its tactical needs, without the 
risk of self-contradiction. This is partly due to differences in organizational cultures, based around the 
intended audience and how they digest material. While the Islamic State has produced thousands of 
publications and videos asserting violence for men only, Boko Haram has primarily spread its message 
through videos and tapes, and only around 100—not thousands—of them. This is due to Boko Ha-
ram’s fewer resources, but also cultural differences regarding proselytization: northeast Nigeria has a 
tradition of traveling Islamic preachers who evangelize in person. Boko Haram’s founder Muhammad 
Yusuf mainly relied on oral Dawa’ around Maiduguri, Borno State, to gain followers, although he also 
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produced written tracts and widely circulated audio and video recordings.293 
A third reason for Boko Haram’s FST is Shekau himself. He innovated female suicide bombing at a 
time when it maximized not just Boko Haram’s global status, but his own. Shekau’s own personality 
likely has some bearing on this innovation, as with al-Zarqawi in AQI before him. On the rare occa-
sions when Shekau has explicitly articulated Boko Haram’s position on gender, it has served his tactical 
goals and legitimized GBV. Shekau, for example, emphasized the inadmissibility of violence against 
women, consistent with salafi-jihadi doctrine, when Boko Haram’s wives were being arrested.294 Other 
notable Shekau pronouncements on gender have (mis)used “ideology” to justify GBV, as in the May 
2014 Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping claim and in January 2017, the claim of FST. As previously noted, 
this led to criticism by Mamman Nur and likely influenced the August 2016 split in the movement 
and Shekau’s dismissal from ISWAP.
Like their approach to gender, the partnership between the Islamic State and Boko Haram from 
2014-2017 appears first and foremost strategic, with insistence on an ideologically coherent partner-
ship secondary. The Islamic State strove to further its “brand” through expansion, and the addition of 
new provinces, including in West Africa.295 It tolerated Boko Haram FST, at least until the removal of 
Shekau as ISWAP wali, while surely recognizing that the coercion of any women or girls into suicide 
bombing completely transgressed Islamic State ideology, effectively inverting the high-status role of 
bomber and symbolic power of the willing male “martyr.”296 The use of abducted women as female sui-
cide bombers in particular would transform those with lowest status under the Islamic State (enemy 
slave women) to the highest status role (martyrs). This transgresses not only the primary ideological 
boundary between men and women, but also the second binary, distinguishing enemy women from 
women of the state. Again, this suggests FST is a campaign with primarily—albeit not exclusively—
tactical and organizational objectives for Boko Haram. The Islamic State was not only willing to turn 
a blind eye, but to adopt FST itself when the need arose.
Discussion
Whatever their differences on female suicide terrorism, this chapter has sought to show that the 
gendered stances of both Boko Haram and the Islamic State fulfill the same goal: advancing each 
movement militarily and enabling GBV. One was focused on the creation of a “religious” state (the 
Islamic State) and the other on the defeat of an “irreligious” one (Nigeria). Until 2017, the Islamic 
State demonstrated strict division of gender roles and was careful to justify GBV as part of a highly 
codified and well publicized “Islamic” system. This helped it recruit and build its governance project. 
Lacking a similar goal, Boko Haram’s justifications were more sporadic, less systemized. However, 
both movements clearly abuse women and adapt theology to justify this. The ostensibly theologically 
systematized violence endorsed by the Islamic State is, in practice, irregularly applied and permits 
rape and other criminality. Boko Haram’s violence may often appear chaotic and lacking rigid ideo-
logical explication; yet it fulfils a strategic aim. Boko Haram’s GBV and the Islamic State’s treatment 
of women suggest shared practices rooted in the adaptation of salafi-jihadi practices, exploitation of 
cultural patriarchal norms, and crucially, prioritization of strategy over ideology.297 
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This chapter has also linked Boko Haram’s use of FST to Shekau. Boko Haram is, as of the end of 2017, 
a fractured movement, with at least two competing leaders and a lack of coherent ideology. Shekau has 
little to attract recruits but fear and violence. The Islamic State is also no longer a winning side. Any 
status afforded to Boko Haram fighters through the link to the Islamic State’s global jihad is dimin-
ished. This dent to the Islamic State’s reputation offers those West Africans seeking violent jihad the 
prospect of collaboration with al-Qa`ida-aligned militants in North Africa; it also further threatens the 
coherence of Boko Haram, which has often consisted of factions. While fluidity has previously been a 
strength of the movement, this threatens to become a weakness in the absence of clear goals, splitting 
efforts to recruit and even leading to open confrontation.298
The dynamic events on the ground, alongside the complexities of female suicide bombing in West 
Africa, suggest an increasingly open future for female Boko Haram supporters. After a period of inac-
tivity from June to September 2016, female suicide bombers returned as Shekau apparently reasserted 
his authority. How further internal shifts may impact on this situation is not clear. Women in IDP 
camps are under increasing pressure, with reports of sexual exploitation enabling food shortages in 
northeastern Nigeria.299 They present possible targets for Boko Haram recruiters who are regrouping 
after internal conflict. Another factor is the return to reclaimed areas of women sympathetic to Boko 
Haram’s cause, and men released from detention. Such factors provide a possible enabling environ-
ment for female violence. Additionally, state actions such as the shooting of suspected bombers, the 
accidental Nigerian Air Force bombing of an IDP camp, or failure to provide humanitarian assistance 
against famine may increase local support for an “alternative” approach. There is no room for compla-
cency even while Boko Haram is “technically defeated.”300
Additionally, as al-Zarqawi perhaps inspired Shekau in female bombing, Shekau may inspire others. 
Active female involvement in Boko Haram, even if frequently coerced, may have—through “conta-
gion”—encouraged female supporters of the Islamic State who desired a greater role in the violence. 
The October 2017 Islamic State edict in al-Naba magazine and the February 2018 video now apparent-
ly legitimize this, and may further incite women in Europe, Bangladesh, or Indonesia who are seeking 
permission to become female suicide bombers.301 Since factionalization and Shekau’s decline in power, 
West African female suicide bombing may be less effective; yet after a period in 2014-2015 in which 
FST was only evident in West Africa, it is now appearing in other parts of the world in which violent 
jihadi groups are active.302 The fall of the caliphate and the “fall” of Shekau may ironically open violent 
opportunities for female Islamic State supporters, if not real power.
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